Pour revenir au sujet et rebondir sur le message de
@nonolimitus sur l'Irlande, la newsletter du Guardian brosse une typologie des attitudes européennes au sujet de la suite vis à vis de l'Ukraine et d'une politique de défense commune. Je fais un vopier-coller car c'est un peu perdu dans la newsletter.
After the watershed summit earlier this month where European leaders agreed to an €800bn (£670bn) plan to increase defence spending, yesterday’s Brussels meeting was “a lot quieter”, Jennifer said.
But it is a measure of how sharply European foreign policy has shifted that the matters under discussion were still momentous. The European Commission set out more detail on a loan scheme worth €150bn (£125bn) to cover defence investments earlier this week. A plan to send billions in immediate military aid to Ukraine was downgraded to a request to send ammunition. And it remains unclear how many countries will take advantage of a new carveout from debt rules to spend more on their defence – or what exactly might be counted in that category.
“For context, the EU is still divided over how to repay the debts taken on coming out of the pandemic,” Jennifer said. “So it’s not surprising that on how to fund European rearmament, there are political tensions over all of it.”
The frontline | Poland, Baltic and Nordic countries
A glance at a map or history book should make it fairly clear why this group takes the most hawkish view: proximity to Russia. With polls showing consistently high levels of support for Ukraine, “they are Ukraine’s really staunch supporters,” Jennifer said. “They have the strongest recognition of the threat from Russia, and they keep stressing the urgency for Europe to increase defence spending.”
Some supported the proposals to pledge €40bn (£33bn) in EU military aid to Ukraine this year, but that idea was shelved in the face of opposition from France, Spain and Italy. Meanwhile, Poland and the Baltic nations – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – are planning to withdraw from a convention banning anti-personnel landmines so that they can strengthen their border defences.
The Financial Times reported yesterday that the Nordic nations are working with the UK, France, and Germany on a plan to gradually take greater responsibility for the continent’s security from the US, in the hope of getting Donald Trump to agree to a managed transfer over the next five to 10 years - rather than making an abrupt exit from Nato.
The giants | France and Germany
The two biggest players in the EU are not perfectly aligned, Jennifer pointed out. “France is in the lead when it comes to ideas about putting boots on the ground,” she said.
“Macron has said for years that Europe needs to be more independent from the US, and that it should think more about hard power. Whatever stripe of government is in charge in Germany, it tends to be more cautious. But ultimately it is giving much more to Ukraine than France is” – $17.3bn against $4.9bn from 2022 to 2024.
Still, the two countries are united in making the most aggressive moves to grow their defence industries, and to loosen rules on debt for defence spending. Macron has successfully pushed for a “Buy European” rule for the loan scheme. And incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz pushed a plan that narrowly passed the Bundestag this week to exempt defence and security spending from debt rules.
In this opinion piece, Martin Kettle describes that vote as “a genuine turn in the road for postwar Germany” – but also emphasises its influence over the rest of Europe: by changing its own rules, he writes, Berlin has “removed the longstanding excuse behind which some European states have been content to hide”.
The reluctant supporters | Italy, Spain, and Portugal
In the south of Europe is a group of countries that take a more cautious view. “They do support Ukraine, but in a less full-throated way,” Jennifer said. “And they have other security issues on their mind.”
She pointed to a recent FT interview with Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez in which he called for the definition of defence spending to include cybersecurity, anti-terrorism work, and “the real threat of the climate emergency in the Mediterranean”. Italy has taken a similar view. Along with Portugal, they sit close to the bottom of the Nato defence spending league table, spending less than the 2% of GDP target; they also lag in aid to Ukraine. Greece, although spending much more on defence partly because of longstanding tensions with Turkey, is aligned with Spain in wanting grants to member states to strengthen their militaries.
Like the countries nearer Russia, geography plays a large part in their priorities. Indeed, Sánchez said yesterday that “the challenges that we face in the southern neighbourhood are a bit different to the ones the eastern flank face.”
“There is a reluctance to spend a lot on defensive measures ultimately aimed at the other side of Europe,” Jennifer said. “That naturally goes down badly with the northern European countries – which also question whether it’s fair to use grants to help countries which have failed to hit the 2% target when they promised to a long time ago.”
The illiberal bloc | Hungary, Slovakia and – maybe – the Czech Republic
Yesterday, 26 EU member states signed a joint text saying that the bloc is “ready to step up further pressure on Russia”. One country refused: Hungary. Yesterday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a veiled reference to Hungary’s authoritarian leader, Viktor Orbán, and his efforts to block Ukraine’s EU membership, saying: “It is simply anti-European when one person blocks decisions that are important for the entire continent”.
“Hungary is in a class all by itself,” Jennifer said. In this analysis piece from earlier this month, she explains that opposition from Orbán – who last year became the first western leader to meet Vladimir Putin since the beginning of the war – means that “EU member states are increasingly interested in ‘coalitions of the willing’”.
Hungary is not entirely isolated: Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico has also sympathised with Russia and threatened to cut off electricity exports to Kyiv, while a billionaire businessman and ally of Orbán, Andrej Babiš, could adopt similar policies if his party wins the Czech Republic’s upcoming elections. Until now, Hungary has always acceded to new sanctions plans in the end – but it is an open question whether Orbán will take a different view in the light of Donald Trump’s sympathy for Moscow.
The nearly-Europeans | UK and Canada
The UK, as you will have heard, is no longer part of the EU; Canada is separated by an ocean. But the new geopolitical reality imposed by Trump has prompted a rapid reassessment of foreign policy priorities, and both are now viewed as strong allies whose support can play a crucial role in bolstering European security.
Canada, under new prime minister Mark Carney, is in advanced talks with the EU about building European fighter jets and other military equipment – in part so that its economy is better insulated from the whims of the White House in the future. At the moment, UK arms companies are excluded from the new €150bn rearmament fund – but that could change if a defence and security pact is signed. A key question is whether it can be negotiated separately from wider talks on post-Brexit arrangements.
All of that suggests how deeply Trump’s stance on Ukraine has shaken Europe. “The great cliche of Brussels is you need a crisis to move forward,” Jennifer said. “There is a real sense that the EU has been shocked into finally doing something about its defence. But it is also entirely possible that when all of this has shaken out, southern and northern Europe will be split.”
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